economist as the solution to an e¢ cient bargaining protocol), as in the Property Rights Theory.
I will focus on the third justi…cation, providing some of the arguments given in a sequence of papers (Maskin and Tirole, 1999; Maskin and Moore, 1999; Maskin, 2002) about why this justi…cation alone is insu¢ cient if parties can foresee the payo¤ consequences of their actions (which they must if they are to accurately assess the payo¤ consequences of different allocations of property rights). In particular, these papers point out that there exists auxiliary mechanisms that are capable of ensuring truthful revelation of mutually known, payo¤-relevant information as part of the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Therefore, even though payo¤-relevant information may not be directly observable by a third-party enforcer, truthful revelation via the mechanism allows for indirect veri…cation, which implies that any outcome attainable with ex ante describable states of the world is also attainable with ex ante indescribable states of the world.
This result is troubling in its implications for the Property Rights Theory. Comparing the e¤ectiveness of second-best institutional arrangements (e.g., property-rights allocations) under incomplete contracts is moot when a mechanism exists that is capable of achieving, in this setting, …rst best outcomes. In this note, I will provide an example of the types of mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, and I will point out a couple of recent criticisms of these mechanisms.
An Example of a Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanism I will …rst sketch an elemental hold-up model, and then I will show that it can be augmented with a subgame-perfect implementation mechanism that induces …rst-best outcomes.
Hold-Up Problem There is a Buyer (B) and a Seller (S). S can choose an e¤ort level e 2 f0; 1g at cost ce, which determines how much B values the good that S produces. B values this good at v = v L + e (v H v L ). There are no outside sellers who can produce this good, and there is no external market on which the seller could sell his good if he produces
There are three periods:
1. S chooses e. e is commonly observed but unveri…able by a third party.
2. v is realized. v is commonly observed but unveri…able by a third party.
3. With probability 1=2, B makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to S, and with probability 1=2, S makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to B.
This game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. At t = 3, if B gets to make the o¤er, B asks for S to sell him the good at price p = 0. If S gets to make the o¤er, S demands p = v for the good. From period 1's perspective, the expected price that S will receive is E [p] = v=2, so S's e¤ort-choice problem is max e2f0;1g
Since (v H v L ) =2 < c, S optimally chooses e = 0. In this model, ex ante e¤ort incentives arise as a by-product of ex post bargaining, and as a result, the trade price may be insu¢ ciently sensitive to S's e¤ort choice to induce him to choose e = 1. This is the standard hold-up problem. Note that the assumption that v is commonly observed is largely important, because it simpli…es the ex post bargaining problem.
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanism While e¤ort is not veri…able by a third-party court, public announcements can potentially be used in legal proceedings. Thus, the two parties can in principle write a contract that speci…es trade as a function of announcementsv made by B. If B always tells the truth, then his announcements can be used to set prices that induce S to choose e = 1. One way of doing this is to implement a mechanism that allows announcements to be challenged by S and to punish B any time he is challenged. If S challenges only when B has told a lie, then the threat of punishment will ensure truth telling.
The crux of the implementation problem, then, is to give S the power to challenge announcements, but to prevent "he said, she said" scenarios wherein S challenges B's announcements when he has in fact told the truth. The key insight of SPI mechanisms is to combine S's challenge with a test that B will pass if and only if he in fact told the truth.
To see how these mechanisms work, and to see how they could in principle solve the holdup problem, let us suppose the players agree ex-ante to subject themselves to the following multi-stage mechanism. does not, then S also has to pay F to the third-party enforcer.
The game induced by this mechanism seems slightly complicated, but we can sketch out the game tree in a relatively straightforward manner.
If the …ne F is large enough, the unique SPNE of this game involves the following strategies. If B is challenged, he accepts the counter o¤er and buys the good at the counter-o¤er price ifv < v and he rejects it ifv v. S challenges B's announcement if and only if v < v, and B announcesv = v. Therefore, B and S can, in the …rst stage, write a contract of the form p (v) =v + k, and as a result, S will choose e = 1.
To …x terminology, the mechanism starting from stage 4, after v has been realized, is a special case of the mechanisms introduced by Moore and Repullo (1988), so I will refer to that mechanism as the Moore and Repullo mechanism. The critique that messages arising from fragile. By perturbing the information structure slightly, they show that the Moore and Repullo mechanism does not yield even approximately truthful announcements for any setting in which multi-stage mechanisms are necessary to obtain truth-telling as a unique equilibrium of an indirect mechanism. Aghion, Fehr, Holden, and Wilkening (2017) take the Moore and Repullo mechanism into the laboratory and show that indeed, when they perturb the information structure away from common knowledge of payo¤-relevant variables, subjects do not make truthful announcements.
Relatedly, Fehr, Powell, and Wilkening (2018) take an example of the entire Maskin and Tirole critique into the lab and ensure that there is common knowledge of payo¤-relevant variables. They show that in the game described above, there is a strong tendency for B's to reject counter o¤ers after they have been challenged following small lies, S's are reluctant to challenge small lies, B's tend to make announcements withv < v, and S's often choose low e¤ort levels. The question then becomes: why do B's reject counter o¤ers after being challenged for telling small lies if it is in their material interests to accept such counter o¤ers? One possible explanation, which is consistent with the …ndings of many laboratory experiments, is that players have preferences for negative reciprocity. In particular, after B has been challenged, B must immediately pay a …ne of F that he cannot recoup no matter what he does going forward. He is then asked to either accept the counter o¤er, in which case S is rewarded for appropriately challenging his announcement; or he can reject the counter o¤er (at a small, but positive, personal cost), in which case S is punished for inappropriately challenging his announcement.
The failure of subjects to play the unique SPNE of the mechanism suggests that at least one of the assumptions of Maskin and Tirole's critique is not satis…ed in the lab. Since Fehr, Powell, and Wilkening are able to design the experiment to ensure common knowledge of payo¤-relevant information, it must be the case that players lack common knowledge of preferences and rationality, which is also an important set of implicit assumptions that are part of Maskin and Tirole's critique. Indeed, Fehr, Powell, and Wilkening provide suggestive evidence that preferences for reciprocity are responsible for their …nding that B's often reject counter o¤ers.
The …ndings of Aghion, Fehr, Holden and Wilkening and of Fehr, Powell, and Wilkening do not necessarily imply that it is impossible to …nd mechanisms in which in the unique equilibrium of the mechanisms, the hold-up problem can be e¤ectively solved. What they do suggest, however, is that if subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms are to be more than a theoretical curiosity, they must incorporate relevant details of the environment in which they might be used. If people have preferences for reciprocity, then the mechanism should account for this. If people are concerned about whether their trading partner is rational, then the mechanism should account for this. If people are concerned that uncertainty about what their trading partner is going to do means that the mechanism imposes undue risk on them, then the mechanism should account for this. Framing the implementation problem in the presence of these types of "behavioral"considerations and proving possibility or impossibility results could potentially be a fruitful direction for the implementation literature to proceed.
In ‡uence Costs
At the end of the discussion of the Transaction-Cost Economics approach to …rm boundaries, I mentioned that there are two types of costs that can arise when unprogrammed adaptation is required: costs associated with ine¢ cient ex post decision making (adaptation costs) and
costs associated with rent-seeking behavior (haggling costs). The TCE view is that when these costs are high for a particular transaction between two independent …rms, it may make sense to take the transaction in-house and vertically integrate. In the notes, I described a model of adaptation costs in which this comparative static arises. I will now describe Powell's (2015) model of rent-seeking behavior in which similar comparative statics arise.
This model brings together the TCE view of haggling costs between …rms as the central costs of market exchange and the Milgrom and Roberts (1988) view that in ‡uence costscosts associated with activities aimed at persuading decision makers-represent the central costs of internal organization. Powell asserts that the types of decisions that managers in separate …rms argue about typically have analogues to the types of decisions that managers in di¤erent divisions within the same …rm argue about (e.g., prices versus transfer prices, trade credit versus capital allocation) and that there is no reason to think a priori that the ways in which they argue with each other di¤er across di¤erent governance structures. They may in fact argue in di¤erent ways, but this di¤erence should be derived, not assumed.
The argument that this model puts forth is the following. Decisions are ex post noncontractible, so whoever has control will exercise control (this is in contrast to the Property Rights Theory in which ex post decisions arise as the outcome of ex post e¢ cient bargaining).
As a result, the party who does not have control will have the incentives to try to in ‡uence the decision(s) of the party with control.
Control can be allocated via asset ownership, and therefore you can take away someone's right to make a decision. However, there are position-speci…c private bene…ts, so you cannot take away the fact that they care about that decision. In principle, the …rm could replace them with someone else, but that person would also care about that decision. Further, while you can take away the rights to make a decision, you cannot take away the ability of individuals to try to in ‡uence whoever has decision rights, at least not unless you are willing to incur additional costs. As a result, giving control to one party reduces that party's incentives to engage in in ‡uence activities, but it intensi…es the now-disempowered party's incentives to do so.
As in the Property Rights Theory, decision-making power a¤ects parties'incentives. Here, it a¤ects their incentives to try to in ‡uence the other party. This decision-making power is therefore a scarce resource that should be allocated e¢ ciently. In contrast to the Property Rights Theory, decisions are ex post non-contractible. Consequently, whoever has control will exercise their control and will make di¤erent decisions ex post. So allocating control also a¤ects the quality of ex post decision making. There may be a tension between allocating control to improve ex post decision making and allocating control to reduce parties'incentives to engage in in ‡uence activities.
Yet control-rights allocations are not the only instrument …rms have for curtailing in ‡uence activities-…rms can also put in place rigid organizational practices that reduce parties' incentives to engage in in ‡uence activities, but these practices may have costs of their own.
Powell's model considers the interaction between these two substitute instruments for curtailing in ‡uence activities, and he shows that uni…ed control and rigid organizational practices may complement each other. practice, p = O, the signal is commonly observed by L and R, and under a closeddoor organizational practice, p = C, it is not. A bundle g = (c; p) 2 G C P is a governance structure. Assume that in the ex ante bargaining process, L makes an o¤er to R, which consists of a proposed governance structure g and a transfer w 2 R to be paid to R. R can accept the o¤er or reject it in favor of outside option yielding utility 0.
Given a governance structure, each manager chooses a level of in ‡uence activities, i , at private cost k ( ), which is convex, symmetric around zero, and satis…es k (0) = k 0 (0) = 0.
In ‡uence activities are chosen prior to the observation of the public signal without any private knowledge of the state of the world, and they a¤ect the conditional distribution of p given the state of the world s. The managers cannot bargain over a signal-contingent decision rule ex ante, and they cannot bargain ex post over the decisions to be taken or over the allocation of control.
Timing The timing of the model is as follows:
1. L makes an o¤er of a governance structure g 2 G and a transfer w 2 R to R. g and w are publicly observed. R chooses whether to accept (d = 1) or reject (d = 0) this o¤er in favor of outside option yielding utility 0. d 2 D = f0; 1g is commonly observed.
2. L and R simultaneously choose in ‡uence activities L ; R 2 R at cost k ( ); i is privately observed by i.
3. L and R publicly observe signal p .
4. Whoever controls decision`chooses d`2 R.
Payo¤s are realized.
Functional-Form Assumptions The signal under p = O is linear in the state of the world, the in ‡uence activities, and noise: O = s + L + R + ". All random variables are independent and normally distributed with mean zero: s N (0; h 1 ) and " N (0; h 1 " ).
The signal under p = C is uninformative, or C = ;. For the purposes of Bayesian updating, the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal is ' p = h " = (h + h " ) under p = O and, abusing notation, can be thought of as ' p = 0 under p = C. In ‡uence costs are quadratic, k ( i ) = 2 i =2, and each manager's payo¤s gross of in ‡uence costs are
Both managers prefer each decision to be tailored to the state of the world, but given the state of the world, manager i prefers that d 1 = d 2 = s + i , so there is disagreement between the two managers. De…ne L R > 0 to be the level of disagreement, and assume that L R : manager L cares more about the losses from not having her ideal decision implemented. Further, assume that managers operate at similar scales:
Although there are four possible control-rights allocations, only two will ever be optimal:
unifying control with manager L or dividing control by giving decision 1 to L and decision 2 to R. Refer to uni…ed control as integration, and denote it by c = I, and refer to divided 
Solution Concept
A governance structure g = (c; p) induces an extensive-form game between L and R, denoted by (g). A Perfect-Bayesian Equilibrium of (g) is a belief pro…le , an o¤er (g ; ) ; w of a governance structure and a transfer, a pair of in ‡uenceactivity strategies L : G R D (s) ! R and R : G R D (s) ! R, and a pair of decision rules d `: G R D R (s) ! R such that the in ‡uence-activity strategies and the decision rules are sequentially optimal for each player given his/her beliefs, and is derived from the equilibrium strategy using Bayes's rule whenever possible.
This model is a signal-jamming game, like the career concerns model earlier in the class.
Further, the assumptions we have made will ensure that players want to choose relatively simple strategies. That is, they will choose public in ‡uence-activity strategies L : (s) ! R and R : (s) ! R and decision rules d `: G R (s) ! R.
The Program Take a governance structure g as given. Suppose manager i has control of decision`under governance structure g. Let g = ( g L ; g R ) denote the equilibrium level of in ‡uence activities. Manager i chooses d`to minimize her expected loss given her beliefs about the vector of in ‡uence activities, which I denote by^ (i). She therefore chooses
The decision that manager i makes di¤ers from the decision manager j 6 = i would make if she had the decision right for two reasons. First, i 6 = j , so for a given set of beliefs, they prefer di¤erent decisions. Second, out of equilibrium, they may di¤er in their beliefs about . Manager i knows i but only has a conjecture about j . These di¤erences in out-of-equilibrium beliefs are precisely the channel through which managers might hope to change decisions through in ‡uence activities.
Since random variables are normally distributed, we can make use of the normal updating formula to obtain an expression for E s h sj P ;^ (i) i . In particular, it will be a convex combination of the prior mean, 0, and the modi…ed signalŝ (i) = p ^ L (i) ^ R (i), which of course must satisfy^ i (i) = i . The weight that i's preferred decision strategy attaches to the signal is given by the ' p , so
Given decision rules d g `( p ; g ), we can now set up the program that the managers solve when deciding on the level of in ‡uence activities to engage in. Manager j chooses j to solve max j E s;"
Taking …rst-order conditions, we get:
where N c j is the number of decisions manager j does not control under control structure c.
Finally, at t = 1, L will make an o¤er g; w to max g;w E s;"
subject to R's participation constraint:
w will be chosen so that the participation constraint holds with equality, so that L's problem becomes:
The Coasian Program is then max g2G W (g) . where after several lines of algebra, the expressions for these terms are:
ADAP (p) represents the costs associated with basing decision making on a noisy signal.
ADAP (p) is higher for p = C, because under p = C, even the noisy signal is unavailable.
ALIGN (c) represents the costs associated with the fact that ex post, decisions will always be made in a way that are not ideal for someone. Whether they are ideal for manager L or R depends on the control structure c. Finally, IN F L (c; p) are the in ‡uence costs,
When p = C, these costs will be 0, since there is no signal to manipulate. When p = O, these costs will depend on the control structure.
There will be two trade-o¤s of interest.
In ‡uence-cost-alignment-cost trade-o¤ First, let us ignore ADAP (p) and look separately at ALIGN (c) and IN F L (c; p). To do so, let us begin with IN F L (c; p). When p = C, these costs are clearly 0. When p = O, they are:
Divided control minimizes in ‡uence costs, as long as managers operate at similar scale:
Next, let us look at ALIGN (c). When c = I, manager L gets her ideal decisions on average, but manager R does not:
When g = N I, each manager gets her ideal decision correct on average for one decision but not for the other decision:
ALIGN (N I) = L + R 2 2 . p = C, so that there are no in ‡uence costs, and L > R , ALIGN (I) < ALIGN (N I),
so that alignment costs are minimized under integration. Uni…ed control reduces ex post alignment costs and divided control reduces in ‡uence costs, and there is a trade-o¤ between the two.
In ‡uence-cost-adaptation-cost trade-o¤ Next, let us ignore ALIGN (c) and look separately at ADAP (p) and IN F L (c; p). Since
adaptation costs are higher under closed-door practices, p = C. But when p = C, in ‡uence costs are reduced to 0. Closed-door practices therefore eliminate in ‡uence costs but reduce the quality of decision making, so there is a trade-o¤ here as well. Finally, it is worth noting that when p = C, in ‡uence activities are eliminated, so the parties might as well unify control, since doing so reduces ex post alignment costs. That is, closed-door policies and integration are complementary.
The following …gure illustrates optimal governance structures for di¤erent model parame- At the end of the day, any theory of the …rm has to contend with two polar questions.
First, why are all transactions not carried out in the market? Second, why are all transactions not carried out within a single large …rm? TCE identi…es "haggling costs" as an answer to the …rst question and "bureaucratic costs of hierarchy"as an answer to the second. Taking a parallel approach focused on the costs of internal organization, Milgrom and Roberts identify "in ‡uence costs"as an answer to the second question and "bargaining costs"between …rms as an answer to the …rst. The model presented above blurs the distinction between TCE's "haggling costs" and Milgrom and Roberts's "in ‡uence costs" by arguing that the types of decisions over which parties disagree across …rm boundaries typically have within-…rm analogs, and the methods parties employ to in ‡uence decision makers within …rms are not exogenously di¤erent than the methods they employ between …rms.
This perspective implies, however, that unifying control increases in ‡uence costs, in direct contrast to Williamson's claim that "…at [under integration] is frequently a more e¢ cient way to settle minor con ‡icts": modifying …rm boundaries without adjusting practices does not solve the problem of haggling. However, adopting rigid organizational practices in addition to unifying control provides a solution. Fiat (uni…ed control) appears e¤ective at eliminating haggling, precisely because it is coupled with bureaucracy. This in ‡uence-cost approach to …rm boundaries therefore suggests that bureaucracy is not a cost of integration. Rather, it is an endogenous response to the actual cost of integration, which is high levels of in ‡uence activities.
Finally , In particular, the model suggests that if interactions across …rm boundaries involve high levels of in ‡uence costs, it may be optimal to unify control and adopt closed-door practices.
This may be the case when the level of ex post disagreement ( ) is high and when the level The former prediction is consistent with the TCE hypothesis and is consistent with the …ndings of many empirical papers, which we will soon discuss. The second prediction contrasts with the TCE hypothesis that greater environmental uncertainty leads to more contractual incompleteness and more scope for ex post haggling, and therefore makes integration a relatively more appealing option. This result is in line with the failure of empirical TCE papers to …nd consistent evidence in favor of TCE's prediction that integration and uncertainty are positively related.
Organizational Industrial Organization
The informal theory and the two formal theories we have examined so far have taken a partialequilibrium approach and explored how environmental factors such as uncertainty, the degree of contractual incompleteness, and ex post lock-in shape the …rm-boundary decision. In this note, we will look at a model in which …rm boundary decisions are determined in industryequilibrium, and we will derive some predictions about how …rm-level organization decisions impact the competitive environment and vice versa.
Embedding a model of …rm boundaries into an industry-equilibrium framework can be di¢ cult, so we will need to put a lot of structure both on the particular model of …rm boundaries we look at as well as on the sense in which …rms compete in the market. Di¤erent papers in this literature (Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Avenel, 2008; Gibbons, Holden, and Powell, 2012; Legros and Newman, 2013) (2013) insight is that when a production chain's output price is high, the contractible payo¤s become relatively more important for the chain's total surplus, and therefore integration will become relatively more desirable.
Description There are two risk-neutral managers, L and R, who each manage a division, and a risk-neutral third-party HQ. Two decisions, d L ; d R 2 [0; 1] need to be made. These decisions determine the managers' noncontractible private bene…ts b L (d L ) and b R (d R ) as well as the probability distribution over output y 2 f0; Ag, where high output, A, is …rm-speci…c and is distributed according to a continuous distribution with cdf F (A) and support A; A . High output is more likely the more well-coordinated are the two decisions:
Output is sold into the product market at price p.
Demand for output is generated by an aggregate demand curve D (p).
The revenue stream, = py is contractible and can be allocated to either manager, but each manager's private bene…ts are noncontractible and are given by
so that manager L wants d L = 0 and manager R wants d R = 1. The decision rights for d L and d R are contractible. We will consider two governance structures g 2 fI; N Ig. Under g = I, a third party receives the revenue stream and both decision rights. Under g = N I, manager L receives the revenue stream and the decision right for d L , and manager R receives the decision right for d R .
At the …rm-level, the timing of the game is as follows. First, HQ chooses a governance structure g 2 fI; N Ig to maximize joint surplus. Next, the manager with control of dc hooses d`2 [0; 1]. Finally, revenues and private bene…ts are realized, and the revenues accrue to whomever is speci…ed under g. Throughout, we will assume that if HQ is indi¤erent among decisions, it will make whatever decisions maximize the sum of the managers'private bene…ts. The solution concept is subgame-perfect equilibrium given an output price p. An industry equilibrium is a price level p , and a set of governance structures and decisions for each …rm such that industry supply, S (p), coincides with industry demand at price level p .
The Firm' s Program For now, we will take the industry price level p as given. For comparison, we will …rst derive the …rst-best (joint surplus-maximizing) decisions, which solve max
The …rst-best decisions partially re ‡ect the role that coordination plays in generating revenues as well as the role that decisions play in generating managers' private bene…ts. As Denote total private bene…ts under governance structure g by P B g b L (d g L ) + b R (d g R ), and denote expected revenues by REV g = E [ j d g ]. Total welfare is therefore W (g) = P B I + REV I 1 g=I + P B N I + REV N I 1 g=N I .
Since the coordination gap is smaller under integration than under non-integration, and expected revenues are higher under integration that under non-integration, there is a trade-o¤ between greater coordination under integration and greater private bene…ts under nonintegration.
Importantly the di¤erence in expected revenues under the two governance structures, REV I REV N I , is increasing in p and A, and it is increasing faster than is the di¤erence in private bene…ts, P B N I P B I . There will therefore be a cuto¤ value p (A) such that if p > p (A) = 1=A, g = I, and if p < p (A), g = N I. If p = p (A), the …rm is indi¤erent. Industry Equilibrium Given a price level p, a …rm of productivity A will produce expected output equal to y (p; A) = 8 > <
> :
A 1 1 1+pA 2 A p < 1=A p > 1=A:
The following …gure depicts the inverse expected supply curve for a …rm of productivity A. When p = 1=A, the …rm is indi¤erent between producing expected output 3A=4 and expected output A.
Industry supply in this economy is therefore Y (p) = R y (p; A) dF (A) and is upwardsloping. For p > 1=A, the inverse supply curve is vertical. If p < 1= A, all …rms choose to be non-integrated, and if p > 1=A, all …rms choose to be integrated. For p 2 1= A; 1=A , there will be some integrated …rms and some non-integrated …rms. If demand shifts outward, a (weakly) larger fraction of …rms will be integrated. The following …gure illustrates industry
